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We address  three fundamental questions: What does  it mean for an entity to be living? What 
is  the role of inter-organismic collaboration in evolution? What is  a biological individual? Our 
central argument is  that life arises  when lineage-forming entities  collaborate in metabolism. 
By conceiving of metabolism as  a collaborative process  performed by functional wholes, 
which are associations  of a variety of lineage-forming entities, we avoid the standard tension 
between reproduction and metabolism in discussions  of life – a tension particularly evident in 
discussions  of whether viruses  are alive. Our perspective assumes  no sharp distinction 
between life and non-life, and does  not equate life exclusively with cellular or organismal 
status. We reach this  conclusion through an analysis  of the capabilities  of a spectrum of 
biological entities, in which we include the pivotal case of viruses  as  well as  prions, plasmids, 
organelles, intracellular and extracellular symbionts, unicellular and multicellular life-forms. 
The usual criterion for classifying many of the entities of our continuum as  non-living is 
autonomy. This  emphasis  on autonomy is  problematic, however, because even paradigmatic 
biological individuals, such as  large animals, are dependent on symbiotic associations  with 
many other organisms. These composite individuals  constitute the metabolic wholes  on which 
selection acts. Finally, our account treats  cooperation and competition not as  polar opposites 
but as  points on a continuum of collaboration. We suggest that competitive relations  are a 
transitional state, with multi-lineage metabolic wholes eventually outcompeting selfish 
competitors, and that this  process  sometimes  leads  to the emergence of new types  or levels  of 
wholes. Our view of life as a continuum of variably structured collaborative systems  leaves 
open the possibility that a variety of forms of organized matter – from chemical systems  to 
ecosystems – might be usefully understood as living entities.
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It would seem that 60 years after  Erwin Schrödinger wrote his book ‘What is Life?’ we should be able to answer the 
question. However, Nature never ceases to challenge the limits of  our imagination. 
 —M. Y. Galperin (2005, 149)
 This essay will not attempt to provide a definition that answers  Schrödinger’s  question. We shall instead 
address  it by describing a spectrum of biological entities  that illustrates  why no sharp dividing line between 
living and non-living things  is  likely to be useful. The more positive goal of these reflections will be to offer a 
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flexible view of life that does  in fact make good sense of why particular organizations  of matter can be 
described as  living. By identifying the different capacities  exhibited by the various  entities  constituting our 
spectrum, especially problem cases  such as  viruses, we hope to address at least some of the issues  that lie 
behind Schrödinger’s  question and its  many earlier precursors  and subsequent echoes. Such concerns have 
been raised in a striking way by recent attempts  under the rubric of ‘synthetic biology’ to synthesize life from 
basic chemical building blocks.
 In this  paper we shall highlight a tension in standard discussions of characteristics  of life, which tend to 
prioritize one or other of two fundamental but very different features  of living things: the capacity to form 
lineages  by replication and the capacity to exist as  metabolically self-sustaining wholes. We suggest that this 
tension can best be resolved by seeing life as something that arises  only at the intersection of these two 
features: matter is  living when lineages are involved – directly or indirectly – in metabolic processes. But also 
crucial to our argument and, we suggest, to many of the difficulties  that have confronted attempts  to 
comprehend life, is  the observation that the entities  that form lineages  are not always, or even usually, the 
same as  those that form metabolic wholes. Metabolism, the transformative biochemical reactions  that 
sustain life processes, we shall argue to be a collaborative affair. Life, we claim, is  typically found at the 
collaborative intersections  of many lineages, and we even suggest that collaboration should be seen as  a 
central characteristic of living matter – a claim that also has  implications for how we understand the origins 
of life. Further corollaries  of this  non-coincidence of parts  of lineages  with metabolic wholes are, first, that 
we cannot assume the identification of living things with organisms  (at least as  standardly conceived), and 
nor, second, can we assert traditional organisms  to be ‘the’ biological individuals on which selection 
operates. 
	 1. Collaboration and the diversity of  life
 The collaborative nature of living entities  and processes  is  our essential starting point. Darwin’s  theory 
of natural selection has, quite appropriately, focused a great deal of theoretical interest on questions  of 
competition. This  focus, however, has  had the less  salutary consequence of diverting attention from the 
equally important topic of cooperation and has culminated in the assumption that altruism, understood as 
the conferral of a benefit by one biological entity on another, is  a profound theoretical problem. Although 
this  is  generally seen as  a problem pertaining to organisms, a similar argument has  notoriously been applied 
to the topic of genes. Richard Dawkins  (1976) made famous  the idea that genes  are fundamentally selfish 
entities in competition with one another. From this point of view, it is  truly remarkable that the whole 
consortium of genes in an organism’s  genome can nevertheless  manage to collaborate on a task as 
momentous as development.
	 In this  paper we place selfishness in a wider context and emphasize the broader perspective of life as  a 
collaborative enterprise. We are not arguing that interpretations  of selfishness  are invalid but that, at best, 
they can only provide a limited perspective on life and evolution. Rather than reducing cooperation to 
selfishness, we suggest selfishness  and cooperation might better be understood within a framework of 
collaboration. By collaboration, we mean interactions  between components of a system that lead to different 
degrees of stability, maintenance or transformation of that system. As  in scientific collaborations, there may 
be some strongly selfish interests  involved in such interactions (Hull 1988) but these selfish activities  can only 
operate in a collaborative context. Defecting from collaboration is  only possible if collaboration is  the 
general default.
 In every domain of organismal life, there are extensive sets  of organisms  that are problematic for 
standard evolutionary understandings  of selfish individuals  (Roughgarden 2009). Shared interests  can lead 
to highly cooperative ‘team’ behavior, described by Joan Roughgarden as  ‘cooperative teamwork’ (2009: 13). 
Evolutionary payoffs  for such team members  may not be equal, but are distributed across  the whole team. 
Collaboration, however, may also include the ‘mere’ coincidence of individual interests, and it is  often in the 
interest of any individual to collaborate – at least to some extent. Collaboration from this point of view 
covers  a range of interactive processes  that may include both cooperative and competitive activities. At one 
end of this  continuum the goals  of participants  may be completely aligned, while at the other end of the 
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continuum, relationships  may be largely or wholly hostile. We will try particularly to understand the 
evolutionary persistence of apparently ‘parasitic’ or selfish interactions  between organisms, and the nature of 
the entities formed by what are usually conceived as separate biological individuals. 
	 One aspect of collaboration is  merely interactive combination. Thus atoms  combine to produce 
molecules, and the latter have properties  that are not found in any of the atoms of which they are 
composed.  But certainly more than this  is  required to count as  collaboration in the sense we are elaborating. 
In common with most who have considered the question of how living entities  are constituted, we assume 
that there is  one necessary condition for being a living thing that most combinations of atoms  and molecules 
lack: the ability to reproduce. Though we take this to be a necessary condition, it is  less  obvious  that it is 
sufficient. Living entities  have also to be understood in relation to their capacity to sustain themselves 
through biochemical transformations. Metabolism in our account can be engaged in autonomously (this  is 
the usual understanding) or collaboratively, through interactions  with other biological entities. At any rate, as 
the microbial and microbe-like entities  that we shall describe below illustrate, a very diverse group of things 
both reproduce and participate in metabolic systems. 
 Our empirically informed investigation of living matter will not be based on the animal, fungi or plant 
life that has  been the main concern of philosophers  and scientists  concerned with these issues; nobody 
questions  the status  of these as  living things, and the problem is  only one of deciding which of their 
characteristics  confer the status of living on them. We shall focus  instead on the realm loosely referred to as 
microbial, which includes some entities  only contentiously afforded living status. Microbes are a group of 
organisms  biologically and conceptually diverse to the point of incoherence, but then so are the 
macroorganisms  or macrobes  that loom large in most perspectives  on life (O’Malley and Dupré 2007). The 
category of microbes  includes  at least protists  (unicellular eukaryotes, which have membrane-bound nuclei 
and other organelles), prokaryotes  (which don’t have such compartments but are highly organized in other 
ways), and viruses. 
	 Viruses  are the biological objects  that are the pivot of our discussion because many biologists  deny that 
they are living organisms. In fact, they are frequently considered to be test cases  for the boundary between 
life and non-life, organism and non-organism, and biology and chemistry (e.g., Stanley 1957; Wimmer 
2006). They are most often assigned to the second of each of these pairs  of categories. Viruses  are often 
deemed not to be alive on the grounds  that they cannot reproduce themselves  autonomously, and nor can 
they metabolize. They can, however, carry out such biologically impressive activities  as  entering cells, co-
opting the transcription and translation machinery of the cell, and picking up and moving about DNA from 
the organisms  with which they interact.  And by exploiting or collaborating with cellular organisms  in these 
ways, they very effectively reproduce themselves and have no need of  autonomous metabolism.  
 Thinking about viruses and their relegation to the realms  of non-living and non-organismal entities  
necessitates  a consideration of whether organism and living entity are identical categories, and whether a 
minimal account of life has  to begin with cells. Such thoughts  then invite further reflection on other 
biological entities  that seem to have some autonomy but are almost never described as living organisms. 
Joshua Lederberg, a pioneer in molecular biology who first formulated the term ‘plasmid’ (Grote 2008), 
places  these biological entities  in the same category of ‘symbiotic organisms’ as  he does  mitochondria and 
chloroplasts. For him, they comprise part of ‘the organic whole’ (Lederberg 1952, 403). He argues  more 
broadly that any scheme of life has  to work out where to place prions, plasmids, integrons (gene capture and 
integration systems) and transposons  – mobile genetic elements in a genome, sometimes called ‘jumping 
genes’ (Lederberg 1998). (1) 
	 We will take our cue from Lederberg and start our examination of life with a discussion of some of the 
biological entities that inhabit this  grey area between living and non-living, specifically prions, plasmids, 
organelles, endosymbionts  and reduced extracellular symbionts. As  we move along this continuum of 
biological organization to entities  whose living status  is  never questioned (micro- and macroorganisms), we 
will investigate whether these instances  of entities  possess  some of the most frequently cited life-endowing 
characteristics, such as  spatial boundedness, reproduction, metabolism and evolvability, and how our 
criterion, collaborativity, relates  to these characteristics. We will also argue that our account of cellular and 
sub-cellular entities  fits  very well with origin-of-life scenarios  that stress  chemical collaboration and 
community. Our bottom-up perspective, starting at the microscopic level of biology, rather than top-down 
3
OPEN ACCESS - Freely Available at philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org
DUPRÉ, J. AND M.A. O’MALLEY — VARIETIES OF LIVING THINGS
from its  most complex and undisputed exemplars, will suggest that much standard thinking is  based on quite 
restricted and even covertly normative conceptions  of what life is. This  perspective will ultimately challenge 
the view that entities such as viruses are not alive and that the minimal definition of  life must be cellular.
	 2.  A spectrum of  biological entities
	 2.1  Prions
 Once thought of as ‘slow viruses’, prions  are now commonly understood to be self-propagating proteins 
that are able to convert normal proteins  of the same type into the pathogenic prion conformation 
(Weissmann 2004; Prusiner 1998; Soto and Saborio 2001). (2) They have a life cycle from induction (3) to 
self-perpetuation (the conversion of another protein). Prions  are very robust and persisting entities, because 
their conformation makes them highly resistant to inactivation by chemical, heat and irradiation treatments. 
	 The central oddity of prions is  that they propagate autocatalytically in a protein-only form, without 
DNA involvement. (4) For this reason, they are frequently referred to as  protein-based genes  (Wickner et al. 
2004; Uptain and Lindquist 2002). Although best known as  non-Mendelian hereditary elements  (5) in 
diseased sheep, cattle and humans, prions  exist in unicellular organisms  too. Yeast and other fungal prions 
share no amino acid sequence similarities  with mammal prions, and they function and are transmitted very 
differently (Bousset and Melki 2002; Uptain and Lindquist 2002; Weissmann et al. 2002). Nevertheless, 
experimental work on yeast prions has  provided deep insights  into conformational change in proteins  and 
their transmission (Wickner et al. 2007). 
 The Modern Synthesis  does  not cope well with prions, and this  has  led some commentators  to propose 
that a more comprehensive theory of inheritance is  needed for prions to be properly understood 
evolutionarily (Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Chernoff 2001). The prion-forming potential of the implicated 
yeast proteins  is  evolutionarily conserved, implying that it is  adaptive (Chernoff et al. 2000). Diverse 
functions  have been identified or proposed for prions  in a range of taxa. There is  some evidence that prions 
are associated with epigenetically enabling yeast cells  to cope with fluctuating environments, and that they 
play a role in memory formation in sea slugs  (Shorter and Lindquist 2005). The non-pathogenic isoform of 
human prion proteins  (the functions of which are still largely mysterious) is  linked to the prevention of 
Alzheimer’s disease (Parkin et al. 2007). 
 These capabilities  and characteristics  do not give a ready answer to the question of whether the self-
propagational status  of prions gives  them the status of being alive. Although genes  are frequently given a 
special ‘informational’ role in accounts of heredity (e.g., Hood and Galas  2003), the conferral of a similar 
status  on proteins  – as  information-bearing molecules  – does  not simultaneously make them into living 
entities. Genes  and proteins are not classified as  alive in their own rights, (6) despite the wide-spread ‘selfish 
DNA’ thesis  that seems to confer autonomy on nucleotides  (Doolittle and Sapienza 1980; Orgel and Crick 
1980), and despite the recognition of the absolute centrality of enzymes to life processes  (Kornberg 1989; 
Lezon et al. 2006). 
 Prions exhibit collaborative behaviors  that benefit themselves, as  a class  of protein isoforms, as  well as  
their hosts. When low amounts  of the non-pathogenic isoform are produced, the prion conversion process 
halts, and when high amounts  of the former are produced, it may stimulate spontaneous  prion formation in 
the previously prion-free cell (Chernoff et al. 2000; Derkatch et al. 2001). Prion propagation in yeast 
requires  the involvement of chaperon proteins. Moreover, prions  in yeast are associated with greater 
adaptability in yeast because they increase protein variation – a factor that may prove advantageous  in 
variable environments  and eventually be genetically assimilated (True and Lindquist, 2000; Pál 2001; Masel 
and Bergman 2003). It is  these abilities  to interact with biological processes  at different levels  of organization 
that presumably explain evolutionarily the prion’s powers of  persistence.
	 2.2  Plasmids
 Plasmids  are small, stably inherited and self-replicating molecules  of DNA (sometimes  RNA) that are 
independent of the chromosomal DNA in bacterial, archaeal and eukaryotic cells. Plasmids are prolific and 
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diverse; they may be larger than some prokaryote genomes  (del Solar et al. 1998). Many are mobile genetic 
elements  that direct their own transmission to new host cells  during conjugation (the unicellular equivalent 
of sex), thereby spreading themselves to closely related and evolutionarily distant prokaryotes  (Thomas  2000; 
2006; Sørensen et al. 2005). They are then transmitted vertically, from mother to daughter cells. 
 Plasmids  have a two-stage life cycle of establishment and proliferation followed by a steady state that 
matches the cell cycle (del Solar and Espinosa 2000). Neighbouring plasmid-free cells  are often killed by 
plasmids, and this  leads  to a very high rate of successful infection (Gerdes  et al. 1986; Eberhard 1990; Bingle 
and Thomas  2001). The complexities  of plasmid characteristics  have led some biologists  to describe them as 
‘subcellular organisms’ or endosymbionts with distinct autonomy from their host (Perlin 2002, 508). Because 
of their many talents, plasmids  have become a mainstay of laboratory genetic manipulation as  vectors  of 
gene transfer. 
	 Plasmids  are often described as  selfish in the same way that other genetic elements are because they 
encode genes that are not essential for the host and may impose fitness  costs (Kado 1998). Importantly, 
however, they also play more cooperative roles  in cells  (Wegrzyn 2005). Plasmids  often encode and express 
genes  of a variety of functions apart from those for their own mobility and replication, such as  antibiotic 
resistance, virulence, environmental protection (including biofilm formation), DNA repair and 
supplementary metabolic pathways  (Barton et al. 1995; Ghigo 2001). They can thus be seen as  collaborative 
elements  that enhance the functionality and adaptiveness  of their host cells. The fact that these features 
favour plasmid survival has  allowed these phenomena to be interpreted as  instances  of selfishness (Kado 
1998), but in our framework they could equally well be interpreted as  examples  of (sometimes  mutualistic) 
collaboration. 
	 2.3  Organelles
	 Organelles  are diverse membrane-bound compartments  in eukaryote cells. (7) They carry out highly 
specialized biochemical functions  and communicate between themselves  to achieve this  division of labour 
(Lowe and Barr 2007; Munro 2004). Major organelles include mitochondria and plastids (including 
chloroplasts, the organelles  enabling photosynthesis  in plants), as  well as  peroxisomes  (compartments 
involved in metabolic activities that include the oxidative metabolism of fatty acids  and the breakdown of 
hydrogen peroxide) Golgi complexes and endoplasmic reticula. Apart from the nucleus, most organelles  are 
primarily involved in energy generation, transport and storage. They are often highly dynamic, mobile 
structures  that react to relevant features  of the environment to maintain cell function (Cutler and Ehrhardt 
2000; Braun and Schleif  2007; Collings et al. 2000). 
 Organelles  are often considered to be ‘autonomous  structures’ because of their semi-independent 
inheritance strategies  (Warren and Wickner 1996,  398; Nunnari and Walter 1996). Organelles  reproduce 
within cells  and a complete set is  passed on to the daughter cells  during cell division. However, because most 
membranes  have to be inherited from pre-existing membranes  and are usually not constructed de novo, (8) 
organelles  are templated from pre-existing organelles. They self-assemble on the basis  of the information 
their membranes carry about membrane polarity, type and location (Cavalier-Smith 2000; Lowe and Barr 
2007). 
 Two of the most evolutionarily fascinating organelles  were once free-living bacteria. Mitochondria and 
plastids  functioned first as  intracellular symbionts  until most of their DNA migrated to the nucleus  of the 
host over a billion years ago – a process  that profoundly shaped the structure and content of the eukaryote 
genome and cell (Timmis  et al. 2004; Martin 2003). (9) Now, to obtain the proteins they need for many 
functions, including their own metabolic activities, mitochondria and plastids  rely on a protein import 
mechanism provided by the host’s  cellular machinery (Thiessen and Martin 2006; Cavalier-Smith and Lee 
1985). This loss of genetic autonomy is  not total, however, because plastids  and mitochondria retain genes 
for translation and transcription machinery as  well as metabolic function. They divide and grow 
independently of the cell cycle, although mitochondria gain some division assistance from the host cell 
(Osteryoung and Nunnari 2003). As  well as  inheriting their membranes directly, both organelles  inherit their 
own organelle-specific DNA. 
5
OPEN ACCESS - Freely Available at philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org
DUPRÉ, J. AND M.A. O’MALLEY — VARIETIES OF LIVING THINGS
 Mitochondria and plastids  are not only essential to their cellular hosts, but are defining characteristics  of 
them: there are no eukaryotes  without mitochondria or plants  without plastids. (10) Again, it is  obvious  that 
collaboration is  happening here in ways  that benefit – and make dependent – both organelles  and the cells 
they inhabit. Indeed, the eukaryote cell could no more survive without its  mitochondrial residents than the 
latter could survive in natural circumstances outside the cell.
	 2.4  Viruses
	 Viruses  are typically very small packages  of single- or double-stranded DNA or RNA (11) (often just a 
few genes), wrapped up in a coating of protein and sometimes  an additional lipid envelope. (12) They are 
prolific, highly diverse and ancient, although there is incomplete agreement about their evolutionary origins 
(as  we shall see below). Viruses are generally excluded from organismal status  because although they can 
synthesize some of their own proteins, they do not metabolize or reproduce independently (Van 
Regenmortel 2007). They either use their hosts, which probably include every organism past and present, or 
occasionally work in collaboration with other viruses to make necessary enzymes. Viruses  do not reproduce 
by division but by self-assembly of the components  that they manufacture with the help of the host cell. 
Some viruses  influence host behaviour quite significantly by, for example, conferring either protection 
against other viruses or virulence properties (e.g., diphtheria or cholera toxins). 
 Viruses  have well defined life cycles  that are often described as consisting of ‘developmental’ stages  (e.g., 
Luria et al. 1978). The cycle begins  with virions, the inert form of viruses, which are transformed into the 
next stage of adsorption, when viruses  or phages  (the viruses with affinities  for prokaryotes  rather than 
eukaryotes) ‘dock’ onto the outer cell membrane of their hosts  and either enter the cell or have their DNA 
absorbed into it. Their protein coats  dissolve or are discarded, after which the viruses  co-opt the host’s 
cellular machinery to express  genes  that lead to genome replication, maturation (in which the new genomes 
are wrapped in freshly synthesized protein) and, finally, exit the intact or lysed cell. A number of plant 
viruses  move actively from cell to cell, using virus-encoded movement proteins  (Boevink and Oparka 2005). 
Some viruses  have an extra developmental stage in which they remain dormant in the host cell or genome as 
prophages  or proviruses  and are inherited (Casjens  2003; Bannert et al. 2004). Endogenous  retroviruses, 
which are viruses  that have integrated permanently into the host chromosomes  and are inherited vertically, 
have left their mark on many organismal genomes, including our own (Griffiths 2002; Hamilton 2006). 
Included amongst these viruses  are those that are crucial for the development of the placenta in mammals 
(Mallet et al. 2004). 
 The diversity and mutability of viruses  makes  them difficult to classify, although both genome sequence 
and protein structure analyses  are constantly refining viral groupings, which were once based primarily on 
pathogenic effect (Bamford et al. 2005). The term ‘species’ is  often applied, with many caveats, to subgroups 
of virus  divisions  (Lawrence 2002; Hendrix et al. 1999; Van Regenmortel 2007). The aim of such language 
is  to ‘bring the definition of virus species  into line with the species  definitions  of cellular organisms’ (Gibbs 
and Gibbs  2006, 1419). One earlier and another more recent division of life into superkingdoms give viruses 
a superkingdom (domain) of their own: the Acytota or Akamara, both of which are categories  for acellular 
organisms possessing genomes (Jeffrey 1971; Hurst 2000; Weinbauer 2004). These domain-level 
classification schemas  have the potential to identify viruses  as  genuine forms  of life but have yet to gain many 
adherents.
 There are three main hypotheses about the origins of viruses: primeval pre-cellular life (the virus-first or 
primordial hypothesis), degenerate intracellular parasites  (the reduction or regression hypothesis), and as 
renegade prokaryote genes  (the escape hypothesis). The most popular is  currently the third one, which is  that 
viruses  are actually genetic elements  that opted out of cellular organization and are thus true instantiations 
of ‘selfish’ genetic material (Campbell 2001; Hendrix et al. 2000). However, new versions  of the primordial 
hypothesis  are also being promoted. They shift the discussion back to the pre-cellular ‘unselfish’ gene pool 
and give viruses  major roles  as  evolutionary innovators (e.g., Forterre 2006; Koonin et al. 2006; Hendrix 
2002; Hendrix et al. 2000; Claverie et al. 2006). Whatever their origins, viruses  have made extraordinary 
contributions  to the evolution of non-viral life through their proclivity for mutation and recombination, and 
their ability to pick up and move genes  from one organism to another (transduction) and integrate their own 
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and other genetic material into host genomes  (Weinbauer and Rassoulzadegan 2004; Lawrence et al. 2002; 
Karam 2005; Villarreal 2004; Hambly and Suttle 2005). Moreover, their role as  carbon regulators  in the 
global oceans, for example (Suttle 2005), shows  how a broader conception of collaboration is necessary to 
understand the evolutionary, biogeochemical and ecosystemic contributions of  viruses to all living systems.
 The recently discovered Mimivirus  (short for ‘mimicking microbe’) provides  an additional challenge to 
some prevalent ideas  about viruses  and their capabilities. Mimiviruses  are huge (larger in volume and 
genome size – over 900 protein-coding genes  – than many of the smallest bacteria, some of which are 
described below) and, most surprisingly, they carry genes that are known to encode translation, DNA repair 
and metabolic activities  (Raoult et al. 2004). (13) They do not seem to have picked these genes up from their 
hosts. (14) Although these viruses cannot synthesize their own ribosomes  and do not metabolize unaided 
(their metabolic pathways are incompletely coded), they can easily be conceived of as  entities in transition 
from viruses  to free-living organisms  (Forterre 2006; Raoult 2005; Claverie et al. 2006). Mimiviruses 
certainly exhibit more independence than organelles  and, moreover, seem to be in an ‘evolutionary steady 
state’ with no apparent signs of  genome reduction (Claverie et al. 2006, 142). 
 Microbiologists  and other biologists  are highly ambivalent about the biological status  of viruses. 
Although a strong line of thinking throughout much of the history of virus  research and microbiology has 
advocated that viruses  are alive and at least proto-organismal (Burnet 1945; Stanley 1941; 1957; Luria et al. 
1978; van Helvoort 1992), the dominant view of viruses is  still fixed by the assumption that only cellular 
entities are appropriately designated as  living (Moreira and López-García 2009). According to virologist 
Marc Van Regenmortel: 
Only unicellular and multicellular organisms possess  the property of being alive while the 
organelles, macromolecules  and genes found in cells  are not themselves  considered to be alive. The 
differences between viruses  [which are not alive] and various  types of organisms is  quite obvious 
when the functional roles of  the proteins found in viruses and organisms are compared (2007, 133). 
Other microbiologists, however, believe that there are numerous  reasons  to give viruses  the status  of living 
matter. Because they ‘have the intrinsic ability to mediate their own transfer from one host to another,’ say 
Salvador Luria and co-authors: 
Viruses  are independent genetic systems. They are not accidentally separated fragments  of a cell 
genome. They are endowed with genetic continuity and mutability, and contain sets  of genes 
working in concert to make more virus. They have their own evolution, which is  independent, to 
some extent at least, of  the evolution of  organisms in which they reproduce (Luria et al. 1978, 481).
Some virologists  go even further and argue that viruses  exhibit the same primary features  common to all life 
forms, such as  internal homeostatic controls  that enable survival in changing environments, organization 
that is  based on heritable nucleic acids, reproduction, exploitation of environmental resources, diversity of 
components  and their functions, and the capacity to adapt and evolve (Mindell and Villarreal 2003, 1677; 
Mindell et al. 2003; Stanley 1941; 1957). Discovery of the debilitating effects of a minute ‘virophage’ on a 
huge virus has  been argued as  evidence for the aliveness  of viruses: if they can be infected themselves, and 
respond in various  ways  to these infections, then the ‘imaginary boundary’ between viruses  and true 
organisms seems to have been crossed (Claverie, Koonin, in Pearson 2008).
	 A further stream of reflection sees  no contradiction in regarding viruses  as  alternating between living 
and non-living phases:
Outside the host cell, poliovirus is  as  dead as  a ping-pong ball. It is  a chemical that has  been purified 
… and crystallized … with its physical and chemical properties  largely determined … and its  three-
dimensional structure solved. Just like a common chemical, poliovirus has  been synthesized in the 
test-tube. Once poliovirus, the chemical, has  entered the cell, however, it has a plan for survival. Its 
proliferation is  then subject to evolutionary laws: heredity, genetic variation, selection towards 
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fitness, evolution into different species  and so forth–that is, poliovirus  obeys  the same rules  that apply 
to living entities (Wimmer 2006, 56).
The inertness  of virions  outside the cell leads us to think that viruses  are similar to prokaryotes  with spore 
stages  as  well as  to plant seeds and fungal spores. In our conclusion we shall (cautiously) endorse this 
perspective, and also suggest that it is  helpful to distinguish the developmental cycle, which includes  both 
active and inert stages, from the life cycle, which should be applied only to metabolically active phases  of 
lineage-forming systems.
 Historical echoes  of the discussion of the status  of viruses  are amplified by recent practical achievements 
of creating synthetic viral genomes. Several of these have now been synthesized from scratch and used 
successfully to infect cells  (e.g., Tumpey et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2003; Cello et al. 2002). Some of these 
researchers  claim their achievements  are the final nails  in the coffin of vitalism, because their virus 
‘chemical’ was  resurrected in a cellular extract and not a living cell (e.g., Cello et al. 2002). However, those 
who do not see viruses  as  organisms  perceive synthetic viral genomes  as further proof that ‘true’ (cellular) life 
– still resistant to synthesis  from the top down or bottom up – is  something fundamentally different from the 
much more easily created biology of  viruses or plasmids.
 It is  clear to us  that leaving viruses  out of evolutionary, ecological, physiological or conceptual studies  of 
living entities, would allow only an incomplete understanding of life at any level (Weinbauer and 
Rassoulzadegan 2004; Wilhelm and Suttle 1999; Suttle 2005). This  deep and extensive interaction is  too 
biologically important, from our perspective, to be considered as  purely parasitic. Conceived of 
collaboratively, cellular life is  constantly ‘bathing in a virtual sea of viruses’, within and without every cell, 
with evolutionarily significant consequences  for the past, present and future of all cellular lifeforms  (Bamford 
2003, 232). In fact, says  virologist Dennis  Bamford (2003, 235), it is  time to consider dividing life into two 
realms: the cellular realm and the viral one. He believes that only by dealing more thoroughly with a 
concept of life fully cognizant of the role of viruses will we be able to achieve an adequate view of life even 
as it applies to its cellular manifestations.
	 2.5  Endosymbionts 
	 Endosymbionts  are entities  that live inside the cells  of other organisms. Some are mutualists  while others 
are more parasitic. Parasites  are generally distinguished from other symbionts  by their mode of 
collaboration with their hosts. While endosymbionts  have a mutual give-take relationship with their hosts, 
obligate endoparasites  are generally viewed primarily as  receivers  of benefits  and not givers. Increasingly, 
however, these are being understood as  more fluctuating and complex relationships  (Valdivia and Heitman 
2007). Numerous bacteria are obligate parasites that have reduced genomes  and depleted cellular function. 
Rickettsia, Chlamydia (15) and microsporidia are well known examples. Microsporidia have lost so many 
genomic, biochemical and morphological features  that they were once thought to be the most primitive 
eukaryotes  (Keeling and Fast 2002). Now, however, they are deemed to be fungi that are highly adapted to 
their parasitic lifestyles. Rather than relinquishing their genes  to the host genome (as  have organelles), 
obligate endoparasites  have simply lost the genes  that have become redundant due to reliance on host 
provisions (Timmis  et al. 2004; Tamas  et al. 2001). These are usually metabolic and mobility genes, although 
some of  these symbionts retain capacities for intra- and intercellular mobility (Gouin et al. 2004). 
 Despite the ongoing reduction of their genomes, some of these parasites  also acquire and exchange 
DNA via conjugation and transduction (Darby et al. 2007). Obligate bacterial parasites  can be vertically as 
well as horizontally transmitted, and transmission between mammals and other animals  often involves vector 
organisms  such as  ticks or fleas  (Darby et al. 2007). Another form of symbiosis, ‘reproductive 
parasitism’ (Wernegreen 2004), is  employed by Wolbachia. These are widespread hereditary endosymbionts  of 
insects, crustaceans, spiders  and nematodes. The hosts do not depend on their endosymbionts  for 
metabolism or defence, (16) but the bacteria significantly influence host lives  and may induce speciation 
events by reproductively isolating insect lineages  (Charlat et al. 2003; Weeks et al. 2002). Wolbachia control 
the reproduction and development of many of their hosts  by biasing sex ratios  and reproductive strategy 
(asexual rather than sexual), as  well as feminizing genetic males  (Werren 1997; Stouthamer et al. 1999). In 
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addition to being inherited vertically via maternal transmission, Wolbachia spread themselves  laterally, 
sometimes to evolutionarily distant insect hosts. Their genes  are also transferred laterally (in one case the 
entire genome!) into insect host genomes (Dunning-Hotopp et al. 2007).
	 Many mutualist endosymbionts  cannot live without their hosts  and the hosts are frequently just as  
dependent on their endosymbionts. They are almost always  transmitted vertically from host to host through 
the maternal line (Wernegreen 2002). Numerous  insects  are involved in obligate intracellular mutualisms 
with bacteria, to the extent that separate insect and bacterial lineages are fused into single, highly 
coordinated metabolic systems (Wu et al. 2006). These endosymbionts  frequently live in specialized cells 
(bacteriocytes) created within the host organism and their primary endosymbioses  are quite commonly 
associated with secondary endosymbioses (Douglas and Raven 2003; Baumann 2003). 
	 One of the most intensively studied mutualist endosymbionts  is  Buchnera aphidicola, which lives  in tight 
association with its aphid hosts  (about a million Buchnera cells per aphid) and produces  essential amino acids 
for them. It is  vertically inherited from one generation of aphids  to the next and its  few regulatory genes 
appear to control its  life cycle in relation to its  aphid host (Moran and Degnan 2006). Buchnera have tiny 
genomes  due to gene loss  and no uptake of mobile genetic elements. They are about one-seventh the size of 
E. coli (although Buchnera cells  are actually larger and contain many copies  of the genome), with which they 
shared a common ancestor about 200 million years ago (Moran and Degnan 2006). Aphids  and Buchnera 
coevolve and codiversify, meaning the phylogenies  of associated lineages  map onto each other (Moran 
2006). Buchnera are commonly classed as  endosymbionts  but the depth of their dependence on their hosts 
means  that some biologists  see these bacteria as  closer in status  to organelles (e.g., Andersson 2000; Douglas 
and Raven 2003). 
 One key difference that is  often said to distinguish endosymbionts  from organelles is  that endosymbiont 
genomes  encode most of their essential proteins  whereas  in organelles, many of the genes for organelle 
function have shifted to the host genome and been replaced by a protein import apparatus (Cavalier-Smith 
and Lee 1985, 378; Thiessen and Martin, 2006). Not everyone accepts  this  distinction, however, and other 
commentators  see variable degrees  of biochemical and cellular integration between host and 
endosymbiont/organelle (e.g., Bhattacharya and Archibald 2006; Bodyt et al. 2007). There certainly appear 
to be numerous  endosymbionts  making the transition from organism to organelle status (17) and any 
definition of either will have to be based on a continuum of collaborative strategies  rather than clear 
categories  of distinct entities  (Bodyt et al. 2007; Rodríguez-Ezpeleta and Phillipe 2005). Concomitant with 
observations  about the occurrence of these evolutionary transitions  from free-living organism to 
endosymbiont to organelle appears  to be a shift in the language used by biologists: from autonomous 
‘invaders’ to domesticated ‘servants’ to ‘captives’ or ‘slaves’ that have almost totally lost their bacterial 
identity (e.g., Dyall et al. 2004; Baumann 2005). 
	 2.6  Reduced extracellular symbionts
	 A plethora of bacteria and other microbes live in intimate extracellular liaison with plants, animals and 
fungi (sometimes these arrangements are called ectosymbioses  or episymbioses). Cyanobacteria, as  well as 
being ancestral to plastids, live in close symbioses with eukaryotes, providing nitrogen fixing and 
photosynthesizing capabilities  through a variety of mechanisms (Douglas  and Raven 2003). Some are 
vertically transmitted and a few free-living cyanobacteria exhibit trends  towards  genome reduction very 
similar to those in endosymbionts  (Marais  et al. 2007). Some ultimately obligate symbiotic arrangements 
have free-living stages, such as  the Rhizobium bacteria that colonize plant roots  and fix nitrogen for their 
partners. 
 Fascinating as  many of these symbiotic arrangements are (e.g., bacteria that provide ‘legs’ for ciliates; 
others that oxidize sulphur for tube worms  that lose their mouths  and guts  as juveniles  when colonized by 
these ectosymbionts), we will focus here on ‘transitional’ organisms  that seem to be on the very edge of 
‘independent’ living. One example is  Nanoarchaeum equitans, an exceedingly tiny archaeon, which is  always 
described as  an organism despite its  extremely reduced genome and consequent inability to metabolize, 
grow and reproduce independently of another archaeon, Ignicoccus hospitalis (Huber et al. 2002). A better-
known example is  the genus  Mycoplasma, which consists  of very small obligate parasites  that are notable for 
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having no cell walls  (almost all bacteria do, as  do plants  and fungi but not animals  or most protists  (18)). 
They are usually regarded as  the smallest free-living cell (19) although they are heavily dependent on their 
hosts  for amino acid and co-factor biosynthesis, and fatty acid metabolism, especially sterols  for membrane 
maintenance (Fraser et al. 1995; Rottem and Naot 1998). They have lost large numbers  of their genes  and 
are considered to have ‘little adaptive capability’ (Glass et al. 2006, 425). (20)
 Because of this  reduced genome and restricted function, Mycoplasma (M. genitalium in particular) have 
been popular candidates  for minimal cell research, in which synthetic biologists  attempt to recreate the 
simplest cellular form of life from synthetic or engineered components. One of the recent breakthroughs  in 
synthetic biology involved ‘rebooting’ a Mycoplasma  cell with a genome from a different Mycoplasma taxon 
(Lartigue et al. 2007). Although the experiment was  successful, doubts  were raised about the transferability 
of  the technique to less closely related organisms and to those with cell walls (Pennisi 2007).
	 In none of this  research, however, is  it doubted that Mycoplasma is  a living organism, so its  dependent 
nature and restricted function are apparently insufficient reasons  to consider it in the same light as a virus. 
One of the characteristics  that tends to confer organismal status  is  genetic autonomy, or the capability of a 
biological entity to initiate and complete its  own reproduction. This  status  does  not obtain for plastids  or 
organelles, however, which are usually perceived as mere parts  of the cell in which they are found. The 
additional biosynthetic and metabolic capabilities  of endosymbionts and exosymbionts, no matter how 
reduced, seem to be essential to the conferral of organismal status. However, given the complete dependence 
of these processes on contributions from the host cell, the grounds  for this  sharp distinction between viruses 
and (other) symbionts is far from clear.
	 2.7  Unicellular organisms and single cells
 It might seem a strange turn in our discussion to interrogate unicellular organisms  for whether they are 
alive or not, when nobody has  questioned that status. Our point here, however, is  to continue to press  the 
question of whether the boundaries of life are clear cut and, in particular, whether cellularity is  enough in 
itself to confer ‘aliveness’. Certainly, a single mammalian cell on a petri dish, for example, is not normally 
considered a living entity in its  own right, (21) in part because of the highly technical requirements for 
keeping this  cell and its  descendants  alive (Bhardwaj et al. 2006). This  ambiguous  status  is, we believe, the 
same ambiguity that bedevils  our understanding of prions, plasmids, organelles and viruses. Single animal or 
plant cells  are only truly alive when they are collaborating with other cells. Whether prokaryote or 
eukaryote, microorganismal or macroorganismal, cells  work together in a great variety of ways, collectively 
structuring their activities  through numerous  mechanisms. In the same way that cellular life-forms  are only 
fully functional when collaborating with other cells, so are viruses, plasmids  and prions. Is there a hard line 
worth drawing between different modes  of cellular and subcellular collaboration – between collaboration 
and exploitation? We think not.
 Moreover, even when single cells  are considered in isolation, each cell is  a complex of collaborating 
parts. In the case of eukaryote cells, those parts  – as  we saw in the discussion of organelles  – may include 
once free-living cellular entities. A eukaryote cell, in the minds of some biologists, ‘can be likened to a society 
composed of a nucleus  and a crowd of subcellular organelles  in which all members  cooperate for the 
common good’ (Eberhardt 1980,  231). This  is  a complex collaboration, however, because competitive 
reproductive relationships  may also exist between organelles  or plasmids  in a cell (for examples  of such 
competition, see Walsh 1992; Eberhardt 1980; Paulsson 2002). Such competition can also occur between 
cells  in clones, as  when somatic mutations  occur in the meristems  of vegetatively reproducing plants 
(Klebowski 2003; Pineda-Krch and Fagerström 2001). Although the philosophy of biology has  directed 
considerable attention to the problem of conflict in the transition from single cells  to multicellularity (e.g., 
Okasha 2004), it has  not extended a similar level of scrutiny to intracellular cooperation and competition. 
We believe this  is worth doing for a better understanding of these collaborative relationships  between 
biological entities at multiple levels.
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2.8  Multicellular organisms
 Multicellular organisms, particularly plants  and animals, and most notably ourselves, are considered to 
be ‘paradigmatic’ examples  of living entities  (Wilson 2000). Again, we think that this  is  far from clear, and 
that whatever aliveness  consists  of for an animal, for example, it is  a much less  autonomous  state than is 
usually recognized in discussions  of life (especially, but not only, philosophical discussions). The evolution of 
eukaryotes  has  largely been driven by microorganismal interactions, and a variety of modes  of dependence 
between eukaryotes  and prokaryotes endures  and diversifies  in every existing eukaryotic organism. Vast 
numbers  of eukaryotes  cannot reproduce, develop or metabolize without their prokaryote partners. We 
noted earlier that achieving organismal status  is  often understood to be the achievement of autonomy. This 
interpretation can easily mislead our understanding of life and what it is  to be alive. Traditionally conceived 
biological entities  are systems  elaborated around unique genomes, but to consider them as  autonomous 
individuals  is  a mistake, we argue: functional wholeness, the basis of any attribution of autonomy, is  a 
characteristic of  collaborative interactions, almost always involving diverse entities.
 Not only are paradigmatic multicellular organisms more multicellular than is  usually supposed (in that a 
multicellular organism should be understood as  including all the entities that interact to achieve shared 
metabolic and reproductive goals), but even ‘simple’ prokaryotes  could be thought to qualify for multicellular 
status  on this  basis. Take, for example, magnetotactic bacteria, which have organelles  of magnetic crystals 
(magnetosomes) that line up inside the cell and are attached to the flagella of the bacteria. The 
magnetosomes function as  compasses  and guide the bacteria along local magnetic field lines  (preferentially 
north or south, depending on which hemisphere the bacteria live in). As  if this  were not astonishing enough, 
some magnetotactic bacteria live in strictly multicellular arrangements. The individual cells  form a spherical 
group of up to 40 bacteria, constructing an empty compartment in the middle of the group. As  well as 
sensing magnetic lines  together and moving in a fully coordinated manner, the groups  reproduce together by 
coordinated cell division. They grow at the same rate (increasing in volume, not cell number) and then 
simultaneously divide into a new multicellular organism that swims off immediately after separation (Keim 
et al. 2004; 2007; Abreu et al. 2007). Most multicellular organisms  have a unicellular stage, whereas  these 
magnetotactic bacteria have a strong claim to be exclusively multicellular throughout their life cycle. (22)
 More variable in their organization than magnetotactic bacteria and other specialized multicellular 
structures  of unicellular organisms  (such as  the well known aggregating examples of Dictyostelium and 
myxobacteria) are other collaborative arrangements  known as  communities. Prokaryotes  and other microbes 
seldom live as isolated single cells  but cohabit in a variety of communal organizations  such as  biofilms. 
Microorganisms  that live as  parts  of biofilms  express  genes very differently from free-floating (planktonic) 
microbes, and in patterns  that are structured at each stage of the biofilm’s  development (Stoodley et al. 
2002; Costerton et al. 1995).  Communities such as  biofilms  (which may be single or multi-taxa), as  well as 
some populations of unicellular organisms, exhibit well-defined cell organization and a functional division of 
labour that includes  specialized cell-to-cell interactions, the suppression of cellular autonomy and 
competition, metabolic collaboration, combined defence and attack strategies, and the coordination of 
movement, growth and reproduction (Cho et al. 2007; Aguilar et al 2007; Kaiser 2001; Shapiro 1998; 
Kolenbrander 2000; Crespi 2001; Dworkin 1997). Many of these are activities  that no individual microbe 
can accomplish on its  own, and the collective behavior is  often achieved with a cost for individual ‘altruistic’ 
microorganisms (if  they are perceived through the lens of  selfishness).
  Some biologists  and philosophers  may prefer to define multicellularity in ways  derived from reflection on 
animals and plants, and thereby exclude these microbial communities  from that category. But certainly any 
general account of the varieties  of biological organization will need to take account of them and explain 
how they conform to concepts  such ‘multicellularity’, ‘invididuality’ and ‘autonomy’. Do humans, for 
example, stop at their skin and have to be conceived of as  tubular rather than solid in order to avoid 
incorporating large internal populations  of gut microbes? Lederberg, with his  concept of ‘symbiome’, raises 
the question of whether organisms  are necessarily monogenomic or whether a multi- or metagenomic state 
is  the usual state of organismal organization (Lederberg, in Hooper and Gordon 2001; Dupré and O’Malley 
2007). Discussions  of life and its  organization have to take into account the fact that symbiotic relationships 
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are ubiquitous  and all organisms, when conceived as the functional wholes  that interact with their 
surroundings, are multi-lineal and multigenomic. 
 All multicellular organisms  function with the inherited assistance of endosymbiotic partners  in interplay 
with numerous  other forms  of partnership. All unicellular organisms  are infected with phages  and other 
unicellular organisms, and even viruses  have their own phages, ‘virophages’ (La Scola et al. 2008). Although 
viruses  are generally thought of as  strictly parasitic, this  view may owe more to preconception than to 
biological fact. The functions  of micro-alliances  with viruses  are only beginning to be investigated, and one 
early investigative success  has  been delineating the contribution of cyanophages  to cyanobacterial 
photosynthesis  (Lindell et al. 2005). Similarly, the phages that infect the anthrax bacterium, Bacillus anthracis, 
play major roles  in the bacterium’s  capacity to build communities  and to produce the long-lived spores  that 
ensure the perpetuation of the cycle of anthrax infections  in animals  (Schuch and Fischetti 2009). More 
broadly, the role of viruses  as facilitators  of genetic variation in multi-lineage communities  and as 
fundamental agents in biogeochemical cycles  (Suttle 2005) means  they cannot be assumed to be exclusively 
parasitic and self-serving.
 Overall, deep and extensive collaborations between biological entities  blur – at the very least – any 
distinction between so-called individual organisms  and these larger organismal groupings  of which they are 
parts  (Moran 2006; Dyer 1989). They also call attention to the non-discrete and highly dynamic nature of 
biological individuals  (Rayner 1997). Although this  is  not our present focus, we should note that great 
evolutionary significance has  been attributed to symbiosis  (e.g., Sapp 1994). Symbioses  have constituted 
innovations  that have made possible some of the most significant transitions in evolutionary history, as  our 
discussion of  mitochondria and plastids made clear.
	 3. Characteristics of  living biological entities
	 	 3.1 Common criteria of  life
 How is  it usually decided which of these diverse entities  is  alive?  All the definitions  of life in current 
circulation emphasize particular life-bestowing properties. Some of these definitions  take functional criteria 
(such as  reproductive autonomy) to be the most important, whereas  others  emphasize evolutionary criteria, 
such as  continuity or evolvability, or foreground metabolic or organizational characteristics  (Popa 2004; 
Koshland 2002; Pályi et al. 2002; Zhuravlev and Avetisov 2006; Szathmáry 2006). The most inclusive range 
of criteria for deciding whether entities are alive or not is  derived from exemplars  already regarded as 
unquestionably alive. Animal characteristics often dominate these criteria, which are then modified to 
include plants, fungi and unicellular organisms  but to exclude entities  such as  fire and crystals  (Chyba and 
Hand 2005).
	 Spatial boundedness is  widely assumed to be a fundamental criterion of living entities, and is  one reason 
larger biological systems, such as  ecosystems, are seldom classified as  living entities  in their own rights. 
Boundaries  usually consist of enclosing materials  such as  membranes, cell walls  and skin, which separate 
internal from external environments  and enable internal activities  such as  metabolism (Popa 2004). 
Associated with spatial boundedness, and again almost inescapably connected to the project of 
distinguishing coherent subunits from encompassing systems, are stability and the ability to maintain a buffer 
against fluctuating environments.  However, the interconnectedness  of the diverse entities  discussed in the 
preceding text points  to obvious dangers  in assuming that spatial boundaries  can be straightforwardly and 
uniquely identified (Rayner 1997). The boundaries  of a plant and animal are precisely the sites  where 
complex interactions occur between entities  generally considered distinct, but these interactions  are so 
closely coupled that we are strongly tempted to see them as parts of  the same system. (23)
 Perhaps  the most widely agreed criteria for being a living thing are metabolism, or energy transformation, 
and reproduction, the capacity of entities  to make more of themselves. Biochemical transformation of energy 
from the environment, first to maintain their own structural and functional integrity, and second to 
reproduce themselves, is  a plausible general account of what living things  most fundamentally do. 
Metabolism, then, is  a basic means  of survival for anything alive. (24) For many biologists, this  is  the most 
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fundamental biological process and the true demarcator of living and non-living entities  (Gánti 1997; Luisi 
1998). An internal capacity for self-sustainability on the basis  of the processing of external resources  is  a 
common understanding of  organismal function (Luisi 1998).
	 Our reservations  about this  criterion are not about whether metabolism is  a basic characteristic of living 
systems, but whether it can effectively be deployed to make the kinds  of distinctions  into discrete living 
entities that are generally expected by theorists  of biology. The reason for this  is  that metabolism is  typically 
a collaborative activity involving many of the things that are generally supposed to be discrete living entities. 
It is  generally supposed, for example, that a human, qua discrete biological entity, consists  of a lineage of 
cells  deriving in a series  of divisions  from an original zygote. But a functional human consists also of very 
large numbers of symbiotic bacteria, in fact amounting to 90% of the cells  in the total human system. These 
microbial cells are deeply involved in the metabolic processes, most obviously digestion, that maintain the 
functioning of the system (Gill et al. 2006; Hooper and Gordon 2001). Hence, a human, conceived in the 
way just described, is  not capable of performing autonomously the metabolic processes  essential for its  survival. 
If it is  considered sufficient merely to carry out independently some metabolic processes, but not all those 
necessary for the survival of  the entity, then organelles and endosymbionts will count as living entities. 
 While we noted earlier that reproduction is  a necessary feature of life, we also mentioned its  
inadequacies  for a full understanding of life. As  we have shown, viruses, organelles  and even prions 
reproduce themselves. The reproduction criterion is  sometimes tied to autonomous  reproduction, so that 
viruses  and the like, though they are very effective replicators, are often taken to fail this  criterion because 
they do not reproduce independently and must use ‘true’ organisms  from different lineages  to achieve their 
reproduction. However, it is  doubtful whether even paradigmatic multicellular organisms  can meet the 
criterion of lineage-exclusive autonomous  reproduction. Those insects in which reproduction is  substantially 
under the control of endosymbiotic Wolbachia are one obvious  counterexample. But more generally, insofar 
as  reproduction requires  the deployment of metabolic processes, as  it surely must, it depends  also on endo- 
and exosymbiotic microbes. 
 Another criterion sometimes proposed as definitive of life is  evolvability (Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004). One 
highly cited definition of evolvability is  that provided by Marc Kirschner and John Gerhart, in which 
‘evolvability is  an organism’s  capacity to generate heritable phenotypic variation’ (1998, 8420). A 
consequence of taking this  as  criterial for living entities  is  that it would include all the entities  we have 
described down to viruses  and prions.  Our interest in the concept, however, is  rather to make a much more 
general point which, we think, cuts  to the heart of the difficulty in defining a living entity. Evolvability, in the 
sense of Kirschner and Gerhart at any rate, is  a characteristic of lineages. Viruses, prions, organelles, 
unicellular organisms, and multicellular organisms conceived as monogenomic wholes, all form the 
appropriate kinds  of lineages. So, although we agree that these criteria of spatial boundedness, metabolism, 
reproduction and evolvability are truly important to understand life, we believe that they are being 
understood within a framework that misconceives living entities in a fundamentally important way. 
	 	 3.2 Reframing the criteria of  life
 Our reservations about the above criteria arise from the fact that none of the entities  we discuss  are the 
functional entities  that interact with their environment and whose success  or failure in such interaction 
determines  the success or failure of these lineages. These functional entities  are, rather, associations  of a 
variety of such lineage-forming entities. A typical large eukaryote, for instance, is  constituted by entities  of 
all the kinds  we have distinguished above. We might invoke here David Hull’s  (1980) well-known distinction 
between replicators  and interactors, but in a very different way from that originally supposed by Hull. 
Interactors, in our view, are complex systems involving the collaboration of many highly diverse lineage-
forming entities. This  sort of interactor, we also suggest, is  the most fundamental unit of selection. This 
perspective has  radical implications  for the way we think about evolution. It would entail but obviously go 
beyond contemporary concepts of  group selection in multi-level selectionism (Sober and Wilson 1998).
	 Amongst those implications  is the importance of the notion of collaboration, which is  seldom proposed 
as  a criterion of life (although see, e.g., Lezon et al. 2006, for an emphasis  on cooperation). It is  hard to 
imagine life that is  not collaborative, in the sense described above, both at the intracellular and the 
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intercellular level, and we suggest that collaboration is, therefore, one of the central characteristics  of life. To 
treat it as  such it will be necessary to specify more carefully what the relevant sense of collaboration entails. 
We do not want to rule out automatically even simple chemical systems. Some chemical aggregations  exhibit 
growth, reproduction (leading to lineage formation of varying persistence), error correction and 
environmental sensitivity (Schulman and Winfree 2007; Weber 2007). It would be surprising if these features 
were not to be found in the chemical world, because otherwise it would be hard to imagine how life would 
have originated. Our continuum view of life is  open to chemical systems  being sometimes  describable as 
living systems, though perhaps  it is  likely that they will meet the relevant criteria only transiently. Because 
biological entities  in our conception are series  of dynamic and diverse collaborations, boundaries  are flexible 
and unfixed. Any claim that something is  a living thing needs  to be assessed in relation to the general 
characteristics we describe. (25)
	 But more important than any attempt to specify limits  on what is  or is  not alive will be to emphasize the 
contrast between this  perspective on life as  collaborative and the much more familiar assumption that life is 
fundamentally selfish and entails  competition between reproductively and metabolically autonomous 
organisms. The outlines  of our response to the view that only selfish entities  will win out in the battle of all 
against all should by now be clear: The unit of selection, the entity in which selfishness may perhaps  be 
expected as the norm, is a collaboration of  many different lineage-forming entities.  
 The context in which the latter evolve, then, is  quite typically one of collaboration. We said that the 
collaborative whole may perhaps be expected typically to display selfishness. But, of course, this  assumes 
that there is  some natural terminus  to the process of collaboration. We hypothesize that competitive activity 
is  a transitional rather than a terminal state and that such temporarily competitive wholes will exhibit a 
strong tendency ultimately to compete most successfully by engaging in new levels  of collaboration with 
similar or different entities. We see the emergence of sociality as  an instantiation of such a process  as  are, 
more generally, the evolutionary transitions  that have been highlighted by the work of John Maynard Smith 
and Eörs  Szathmáry (1995). Our spectrum of biological entities  exemplifies  a number of different forms of 
collaboration that are central to such an evolutionary schema.  As  we have emphasized, our concept of 
collaboration assumes no sharp boundary between selfish and cooperative interactions, something surely to 
be expected if  the former is inclined to evolve into the latter.
	 We have certainly not exhausted the criteria that have been proposed as  characteristic of living entities. 
We have not explicitly considered, for example, environmental responsiveness, the ability to detect and 
respond appropriately to salient features  of environments, or development, the recurrent production of the 
characteristic stages  of a life cycle (although much that we have said has  addressed these criteria implicitly). 
We do not mean to minimize the significance of these, and perhaps  other, distinctive characteristics  of living 
systems. What we do argue is  that a focus  on metabolism and reproduction, widely agreed to be 
fundamental features  of life, has  the additional virtue of drawing attention to a characteristic that has  been 
greatly underemphasized: that of collaboration. That this  has  been downplayed is a readily intelligible 
consequence of the importance that has  been attached by biological theorists  to competition (Roughgarden 
2009). But for this very reason giving collaboration proper emphasis  could provide important fresh insight 
into the nature of evolutionary processes because it affects how we conceptualize the entities and activities 
central to evolution.
	 4.  Autonomy and the origins of  life
	 Our collaborative interpretation of life suggests  that it is  possible to sidestep the usual problems 
associated with defining life. Although we do not claim to have provided a definition of life, we do believe we 
have offered a view of living matter that offers  a flexible resource for understanding the many ways  in which 
life can be organized. The tension between replicating lineages as  one criterion of life, and metabolic self-
sustainability as  the other, can be reconciled by taking a much more interactive view of metabolic processes 
and by reconceiving cooperation and competition within a broader framework of collaboration. Life, 
according to our analysis, occurs  at the intersection of lineage formation and (typically collaborative) 
involvement in metabolism. Entities  that are problem cases, such as  viruses, can be understood as  alive when 
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actively collaborating. When not collaborating, they have at most a potential for life. We invite our readers  to 
apply our framework further along the spectrum than we have gone, to various chemical and physical 
systems and to ecosystems.
 What of the autonomous  individual organism, often the conceptual target of attempts  to define life, and 
the thing that is  assumed by models  of evolution through competition and selection? To the extent that such 
individual autonomy requires  just an individual life or life history, then it surely applies  much more broadly 
than is  generally intended by biological theorists. Countless non-cellular entities  have individual life-histories, 
which they achieve through contributing to the lives and life-histories  of the larger entities  in which they 
collaborate, and this  collaboration constitutes  their claim to life. But — and this is  our central point — no 
more and no less  could be said of the claims to individual life histories  of paradigmatic organisms  such as 
animals or plants; unless, that is, we think of these as the collaborative focus  of communities  of entities  from 
many different reproductive lineages. In much the same way, whatever sense we might try to make of the 
Dawkinsian idea of selfish genes, molecular replication is  always, and has  always  been from the pre-cellular 
molecular community to the present, the achievement of ensembles  of molecules, not of individual 
molecules (Segré and Lancet 2000). 
 It is  entirely reasonable to think of autonomy as  centrally exhibited in collaboration rather than just 
rugged independence.  Assuming that this  kind of autonomy is  what is  needed to be a living thing, our 
account therefore includes viruses  as not only living matter, but as  full-blown living entities  when they enter 
cells  and interact with the cell’s metabolic capacities. As  virions, they are still lineage elements  but are 
temporarily disengaged from metabolic collaboration (likewise bacteria such as Chlamydia in their inert spore-
like state and perhaps  even many plant seeds  and fungal spores). This  is  why we suggested above that viruses 
should strictly be described as having developmental cycles rather than life cycles. (26)
 	 Taking this perspective not only renders  unproblematic the idea of an entity being sometimes living and 
at other times  non-living but also reinforces  the idea of life and the evolution of life as a continuum of 
collaborativity. Given the acceptance that life has  evolved from a chemical context, ruling out self-replicating 
complexes  of chemicals  and molecules  on the grounds  that they are not cells  seems misguided. A 
commitment to life as  exclusively cellular and monogenomically organismal would mean that the origins  of 
life must involve a single leap from fully non-living to fully living, something that is  conceptually difficult to 
accept and, for that matter, provides  a natural target for creationists  to insist on the need for supernatural 
intervention. The spectrum of biological entities  we have described shows  that an inflexible dichotomy of 
life and non-life is, in any case, highly problematic, even for making sense of the entities  that now exist. Our 
more generous  framework can encompass  a range of theories  about the organization and evolution of pre-
cellular life which give prions, plasmids  and viruses  important roles, as  well as  other macromolecular 
complexes (e.g., Rode et al. 1999; Lupi et al. 2006; 2007; Eberhard 1990; Kado 1998; Koch 1995). 
 We also think that our thesis  of multi-modal, interconnected and overlapping life processes  suggests  a 
more continuous  vision of evolutionary history. Many discussions of early life posit a radical transition from 
a community of genetic exchange to one of restricted vertical inheritance, cellular autonomy and stable 
genealogy (Woese 2005; Dawkins 2008). Although some biologists  believe that pre-cellular life is  best 
conceived as  ‘unselfish’ communality in which genetic resources  are shared (Woese et al. 2000), others  such 
as  Dawkins  presume that pre-cellular life was  driven by selfish replication, and that promiscuous  horizontal 
exchange simply extends the opportunities  for selfishness (Dawkins  2008).  Rather than restricting some 
evolutionary processes to a discontinued past, we prefer to incorporate them into a schema that allows for 
the continuity of  lateral gene transfer as an important characteristic of  today’s collaborative evolution.
 We find here the reflections  of Norris  et al. (2007) and Hunding et al. (2006) very helpful. They argue 
that life evolved as a ‘diverse interacting community of molecules’ – a ‘pre-biotic ecology’ that implies  a 
more ecological and community-based view of any biological entity, pre- or post the evolution of cells. Their 
model describes 
the emergence of life as  a functional ecological system through a process of integration from diverse 
components, not as  a single entity … there is  no identifiable point at which life emerged. Rather, [it 
is] a continuous  process by which increasingly complex, integrated, self-replicating, autocatalytic, 
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module systems  evolve new properties  in tandem with their environments (Hunding et al. 2006, 
409-410).
We believe this sort of dynamic system-based scenario fits more appropriately what we know of the rest of 
the evolution of life. (27) Evolutionary history suggests  that life involves  a range of coevolving hierarchies, 
and that non-life and life share a huge and biologically significant territory that buffers and makes  more 
complex any account of either. Ecology presents  us  with scenarios  of collaboration at least as  compelling as 
those that highlight competition, and the former are rapidly increasing our understanding of the macrobial 
and microbial world (Dupré and O’Malley 2007). Thinking of life as  the result of the intersection of 
lineage-forming, metabolically collaborative matter, organized within different interacting levels, allows  a 
smooth transition from the earliest living matter to standard examples  of life and beyond them all the way 
up to contemporary ecosystems. A general account such as  ours  is  not, and need not be, definitional. It is, 
however, sufficient to encompass what is  known about an ever more striking variety of biological entities  and 
their evolutionary histories, and to reorient approaches  to life around a biologically realistic interpretation of 
collaborativity.
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NOTES
(1) Lederberg also includes in his 1998 list heterokaryon cells that have a diversity of nuclei in a common cytoplasm 
(see Rayner 1997 for details). We will leave these interesting entities out of  our discussion.
(2) PrPC is the generic protein, and PrPSc is  the pathogenic protein isoform. The designation of prion is  made in 
relation to the pathogenic form’s still hypothesized function (Weissmann 2004, 863). See Manuelidis (2004) for an 
argument against the protein-only understanding of  prions, in favor of  their viral status.
(3) Induction can occur spontaneously, through vertical inheritance or by lateral infection.
(4) The gene encoding the prion protein has  to be expressed, of course, but the same nucleotide sequence can express 
either the pathogenic or non-pathogenic conformation of  the protein. 
(5) Prions are described as  ‘non-Mendelian hereditary elements’ because they self-propagate by transmitting their 
conformational characteristics in a lineage-forming manner, but do not form Mendelian patterns of inheritance 
(Liebman and Derkatch 1999).
(6) See HJ Muller (1966, 512) for an older view that the gene is  a uniquely living material because of its capacity for 
reproduction, mutation and enzyme production.
(7) There are increasing reports of a variety of compartments in prokaryote cells  and the rising use of ‘organelle’ to 
describe these structures (e.g., Niftrik et al. 2004; Seufferheld et al. 2003; Kerfeld et al. 2005; Komeili et al. 2006).
(8) Peroxisomes and Golgi bodies can sometimes be reconstituted from other membrane types  (Cavalier-Smith 2000; 
Lowe and Barr 2007).
(9) Mitochondria were incorporated into early eukaryote cells before plastids. As well as primary plastids, obtained in a 
single endosymbiotic event,  there are also secondary and tertiary plastids gained from endosymbioses  of plastid-
carrying organisms (Archibald 2007).
(10) Subsequent loss  or dysfunction notwithstanding. See Embley and Martin (2006) for a demolition of the 
‘amitochondriate eukaryotes’ hypothesis.
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(11) Single-stranded RNA viruses can be divided into positively and negatively stranded (sense and anti-sense) genomes, 
and retroviruses, which make DNA copies of themselves with their own reverse transcriptase before entering the host 
chromosome and being transcribed back to RNA (Ahlquist 2006).
(12) Viroids, which are tiny RNA viruses that infect plants, have no protein coat. 
(13) While some other large viruses also carry translation and metabolic genes, Mimivirus greatly extends the known 
repertoire of  these genes in viruses (Koonin 2005).
(14) Although see Moreira and López-Gárcia (2003) for the opposite claim.
(15) Inert Chlamydia ‘spores’ (elementary bodies) exist outside cells  but the ‘live’ form of the organism conducts all its 
activities intracellularly. Note the parallels with the developmental cycle of viruses, which Chlamydia were once thought 
to be.
(16) However,  Wolbachia in nematodes  do provide host-related metabolic and other physiological functions (Fenn and 
Blaxter 2006). There is  also increasing evidence of insect host benefits from Wolbachia infections (Iturbe-Ormaetxe and 
O’Neill 2007).
(17) Or from an endosymbiont with increasingly limited function to extinction. See Pérez-Brocal et al. (2006).
(18) All organisms have cell membranes, of  course, but not the more rigid cell walls that plants and bacteria possess.
(19) There is  increasing evidence, however, that Mycoplasma are also intracellular symbionts (e.g., Meseguer et al. 2003). 
And the genome of  N. equitans mentioned above is smaller than that of  any mycoplasma.
(20) Mycoplasmas do, however, have multifunctional enzymes that have taken on unusual roles.
(21) See, however, Theodore Puck (1972) for an argument about the autonomy of  mammalian cells.
(22) Abreu et al. (2007) assign the name Candidatus Magnetoglobus multicellularis to this  organism (‘Candidatus’ indicates 
that it has not been cultured). 
(23) Of course we accept the importance of membranes  in the origins  and maintenance of life in general, as well as the 
epistemological necessity of imposing boundaries for both theoretical and experimental biologists. This epistemic 
function does not, however, require that such boundaries be uniquely and unequivocally identifiable.
(24) The necessity of biochemical transformation rules out phenomena such as computer viruses  as  candidates for life, 
because they do not sustain themselves through biochemical means.
(25) Interactors thus conceived also rule out the whole planet as a candidate for evolving life, because although the 
planet could be conceived as metabolizing (in a highly collaborative way),  it does not interact with other such wholes.  It 
also lacks any means of reproducing itself.  We are more ambivalent about ecosystems, which may frequently interact, 
but a case would have to be made for ecosystems forming a lineage that was  more than mere continuity (as  a substitute 
for replication).
(26) It is  tempting here to invoke Kant’s  analysis  of autonomy as the possibility of conformity to duty, an essentially 
socially defined concept, and his rejection of the notion of autonomy imagined as  following no more than the pursuit 
of  contingent individual interests or desires.
(27) Dynamic system-based scenarios of life are a general idea more precisely formulated in work by theoretical 
biologists  such as  Tibor Gánti,  Robert Rosen, Stuart Kauffman, and Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. Our 
emphasis on collaborative interaction suggests congruences with this sort of work,  but we have yet to explore these in 
any specific way.
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